Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 27
Issue 2 Spring 1994

Article 1

Subsidiarity and Competition: Decentralized
Enforcement of EU Competition Laws
Roger P. Alford

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Alford, Roger P. (1994) "Subsidiarity and Competition: Decentralized Enforcement of EU Competition Laws," Cornell International
Law Journal: Vol. 27: Iss. 2, Article 1.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol27/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.

Roger P. Alford*

Subsidiarity and Competition:
Decentralized Enforcement of EU
Competition Laws
Introduction
No longer simply a pedagogical theory of power sharing between the
European Union (EU)1 and its Member States, subsidiarity is now
2
enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty as a "constitutional" mandate,
delineating the proper division of shared powers between them. Article
3b of the Maastricht Treaty provides, in relevant part, that
[i]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
or
achieved by the member-States and can therefore, by reason of the scale
3
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
The Maastricht Treaty thus establishes what may be described as an "allocation of shared powers" doctrine that requires the Union and national
institutions to compete for the right to exercise their duties in instances of
concurrentjurisdiction. This competition is based on governmental effectiveness but has a distinct presumption favoring the decentralized applica* LL.M., Edinburgh University, 1992; J.D., New York University School of Law,
1991. The author is Legal Assistant to the Honorable Richard C.Allison, Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, The Hague, The Netherlands.
1. "European Union" and not "European Community" is increasingly becoming
accepted in usage as the proper designation in the post-Maastricht era.
2. For references to the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaties as the
"constitution" of the European Union, see, e.g., John Temple Lang, The Development of
European Community ConstitutionalLaw, 25 INT'L LAw. 455, 456-57 (1991) (while some

features of European Community law are still "international," an increasing number are

"constitutional"); David Edward, ConstitutionalRules of Community Law in EEC Competition
Cases, 13 FoRDHwm INT'L LJ. 111, 112 (1989-90) (Community treaties referred to as
"constitutional rules" to extent they deal with classical preoccupations of federal constitutions including, inter alia, allocation and separation of powers); Trevor C. Hartley,

Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems: The Emerging Constitutionof the European Community,

34 AM. J. Comp. L. 229, 231 (1986) ("[the] Constitution of the Community takes the
form of a series of international treaties"); but see A.G. Toth, The Principleof Subsidiarity
in the Maastrikht Treaty, 29 COMMON MKr. L. REv. 1079, 1103 (1992) (the Maastricht
Treaty cannot be regarded as a Constitution in the true sense of word; rather than
being a unitary, precisely drafted instrument, it is an amalgamation of three different
types of fairly poorly drafted legal texts which fit ill together).
3. TREAiY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrlY [MAASTRICHT TRFATrY

27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 271 (1994)
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tion of Union tasks.4 Alternatively, as French Prime Minister Edouard
Balladur inelegantly defined it, subsidiarity is "[a] nother word for minding
your own business-something the European [C] ommission should do a
lot more of."5
Consistent with this commitment toward decentralization, subsidiarity
is now finding practical application in the enforcement of EU Treaty provisions. One noteworthy example is the enforcement of EU competition
laws. In recent years, the European Court of Justice, the Court of First
Instance, and the Commission of the European Communities (the Commission) all have taken positive steps to provide more flexibility in enforcing these laws through greater Member State court involvement in their
enforcement. More importantly, recent events indicate that the concept
of subsidiarity is increasingly becoming a fundamental objective in the
enforcement of EU competition laws. 6 As Sir Leon Brittan emphasized in
his farewell speech as Commissioner for Competition in December 1992:
[T]he Community's competition policy has always been underpinned by the
subsidiarity principle ....The entry into force of Article 3b [of the Maastricht Treaty] has, however, provided the Commission with the opportunity
to look afresh at the institutional balance between the Community and the
Member State's competition authorities to determine whether the existing
system ofjurisdiction allocation can7be further refined, both from the substantive and procedural viewpoints.
4. Thus, subsidiarity is grounded in the belief that Member States should transfer
tasks to the Union only if such tasks cannot be effectively accomplished at the national
level or if the effects of such tasks extend beyond national frontiers. MARC WILKE &
HELEN WALLACE, SUBSIDALRri.- APPROACHES TO POWER-SHARING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY 36 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Discussion Paper No. 27, 1990). Put

differently, Article 3b resolves questions of concurrent jurisdiction between Member
States and the Union by permitting Union institutions to act only if Member States are
unable sufficiently to achieve the desired Union objectives such that they will be better
achieved at the Union level. See generallyJoel P. Trachtman, L'Etat, Clet Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and Subsidiarity,33 HARv. INT'L L.J. 459, 469 (1992) ("If subsidiarity is viewed as establishing a rule that issues should be addressed at the level
where they can be addressed most effectively, this principle establishes a competition
for governmental effectiveness among levels of government."). "Concurrent competence" covers a broad range of shared Union and Member State competence in which
both Union and Member States have the power to act. Under the subsidiarity doctrine,
the Union would assert its authority only when it felt the need and would leave Member
States free to act on all aspects on which the Union had not taken action. Toth, supra
note 2, at 1088. But see Vlad Constantinesco, Who's Afraid of Subsidiarity?,11 Y.B. EUR. L.
33, 50 (1991)
([S] ubsidiarity and allocation of competences are distinct, although close [concepts]. Subsidiarity ought to indicate the 'quantum' of Community competences, while their allocation is determined by the constitutional mode
adopted. This does not prevent the two concepts from being clearly complementary: when by the allocation principle a competence is a devolved one, this
indicates its subsidiary character.).
5. Still Lookingfor a Role, ECONOMIST, June 26, 1993, at 64.
6. Subsidiarity is recognized as a fundamental principle of Community law. Constantinesco, supranote 4, at 45.
7. Sir Leon Brittan, The Future of EC Competition Policy, Speech at the Centre of
European Policy Studies, Brussels 1 (Dec. 7, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CRNWS File [hereinafter Brittan Speech).
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Toward this end, the Commission adopted a Notice on Cooperation with
National Courts in Applying Article 85 and 868 on February 13, 1993, to
"provide a catalyst leading to wider implementation of the Community
competition rules at the national level." 9 As shall be discussed below, the
Notice on Cooperation is the Commission's most explicit pronouncement
to date committing the Union to the doctrine of subsidiarity in the
enforcement of EU competition laws.
The purpose of this article is to examine how the European Union
has applied, and potentially will apply, the principle of subsidiarity in the
enforcement of EU competition laws. This article thus focuses on how the
Union envisages national court participation in the application and
enforcement of EU competition laws rather than how, in practice, Member State courts have exercised their concurrent jurisdiction in enforcing
Articles 85 and 86. Part One provides a brief introduction to EU competition law enforcement and examines two recent decisions by the Court of
Justice and the Court of First Instance clarifying the relationship between
the Commission and the national courts in enforcing EU competition
rules. Part Two overviews the procedures national courts should follow in
enforcing competition rules as recently set forth in the Commission's 1993
Notice on Cooperation with National Courts. Part Three assesses the
impact decentralization may have on the Commission's and national
courts' enforcement of EU competition law. Finally, Part Four discusses
the potential for enhanced national court enforcement of competition
laws through national court review of pro-competitive restraints of trade.
I.

Power Sharing between National Courts and the Commission

A.

Introduction to EU Competition Law Enforcement

Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty set forth the basic competition rules
applicable to private undertakings. 10 Article 85 governs agreements,
associations, and concerted practices between private undertakings," and
8. Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts and the Commission in Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, 1993 Q.J. (C 39) 6 [hereinafter Notice or

Notice on Cooperation].
9. Brittan Speech, supra note 7, at 2.
10. TREAT7" ESTABLSHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY].
11. Article 85 provides:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply,
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading

parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
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Article 86 governs abuses of a dominant market position.' 2 Article 85(1)
presents a broadly-worded prohibition on agreements or practices affecting trade between Member States which have the object or effect of
preventing, restricting, or distorting competition within the Common
Market. Pursuant to Article 85(2), any agreements or decisions prohibited
by Article 85 (1) are "automatically void." However, under Article 85 (3) an
agreement or practice may be exempt from the Article 85(1) prohibition
and the Article 85(2) nullification if the agreement or practice, inter alia,
(i) improves the production and distribution of goods or promotes technical progress; (ii) allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits;
(iii) imposes no restrictions that are not indispensable to these objectives;
and (iv) does not eliminate competition with respect to a substantial part
of the products in question.
The principal legal measure establishing the procedural rights and
obligations in the enforcement of Articles 85 and 86 is Regulation 17.13
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such.contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Id. art. 85.
12. Article 86 provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id. art. 86. Because Article 86 is directly effective, national courts may fully apply and
enforce Article 86 relating to the abuse of a dominant position. Case 127/73, BRT v.
SABAM, 1974 E.C.R 51, 62. Accordingly, this article addresses only the hurdles that
national courts encounter in enforcing Article 85.
13. Council Regulation 17/62, 1959-1962 OJ. SPEC. ED. 87 [hereinafter Regulation
17]. Regulation 17 regulates, inter alia, the initiation of an infringement proceeding
with the Commission, id. arts. 2-4, at 88, the Commission's investigative powers to deter-
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Regulation 17 confers broad enforcement powers upon the Commission
to ensure the observance of the EU competition law provisions. Under
Regulation 17, the Commission has a general duty to enforce the competition laws against infringements committed during private undertakings.
The Commission exercises this enforcement duty by launching investigations, inspecting books, rendering judicial decisions, adopting interim
measures, imposing fines and other sanctions, and bringing infringement
14
proceedings before the Court of First Instance or the Court of Justice.
Regulation 17 also gives the Commission exclusive power to grant an Article 85(3) exemption. 15 Thus, under Regulation 17, the Commission
wields real executive powers to enforce and implement the EU competi16
tion laws.
In applying Article 85(1), the Commission generally has refused to
balance the pro- and anti-competitive effects of trade restrictive provisions. 17 Rather, it has opted to cast the net of Article 85(1) very broadly,
8
bringing the great preponderance of agreements within its ambit.1 As a
result, a large number of agreements or practices are caught by Article
85(1), and to be valid, such agreements must be exempted under Article
85(3). This expansive reading of Article 85(1) coupled with the Commission's exclusive exemption power has resulted in an enormous backlog of
applications before the Commission. 19 As recent commentators have
noted, the Commission's approach has "created an absurd discrepancy
between the Commission's theoretical jurisdiction and its capacity to generate the decisions called for by its over-broad interpretation of Article
85(1)."20 Indeed, the Commission recognized this dilemma when, in an
mine the existence of an infringement, id. arts. 11-14, at 90-91, applications for exemptions under Article 85(3), id. arts. 4-7, at 88-89, and sanctions for an infringement, id.
arts. 3,15-16, at 88, 91-92.
14. Francis G. Jacobs, Civil Enforcement of EECAntitrust Law, 82 MicH. L. REv. 1364,
1365 (1984).
15. Regulation 17, supra note 13, art. 9(1), at 89.
16. DERRICK WYATr &ALAN DAsHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTrvE LAW OF THE EEC 431 (2d
ed. 1987).
17. The Commission instead has concluded that if the freedom of action of the
parties to the agreement has a perceptible external effect, the agreement comes within
the Article 85(1) prohibition. An external effect is "perceptible" if it has a theoretical
effect on the action of third parties, rather than a showing that the agreement in fact
had an adverse impact on competition. Jan Peeters, The Rule of Reason Revisted: Prohibition on Restraints of Competition in the Sherman Act and the EEC Treaty, 37 AM. J. Comp. L.
521, 537, 540 (1989).
18. Ian Forrester & Christopher Norall, The Laicization of Community Law: Self-Help
and the Rule of Reason: How Competition Law is and Could be Applied, 21 COMMON MKT. L.
RPv. 11, 23 (1984).
19. Regulation 17, supranote 13, art. 9(1), at 89. Reading Article 85(1) as violated
whenever an agreement has a theoretical effect on third parties' freedom of action,
combined with the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction over Article 85(3) exemptions,
has led to administrative problems. Such an approach meant that the Commission had
to be notified of almost every agreement resulting in the enormous backlog of applications. Peeters, supra note 17, at 540.
20. Ian S. Forrester & Christopher Norall, Competition Law, 1990 Y.B. EUR. L. 407,
409.
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earlier draft of the Notice on Cooperation, it conceded that "it has now
become clear that-because of the extraordinary number of cases-the
supposition of a formal [Article 85(3)] decision in every instance does not
21
match the reality."
In an effort to deal with the unmanageable workload, in recent years
the Commission has attempted to overhaul the administration of the competition rules by (i) issuing informal "comfort letters" 22 indicating that an
agreement is not caught by Article 85(1); (ii) adopting "block exemptions" 23 for classes of agreements that do not require individual attention;
(iii) expediting the notification process through modifications in "Form
A/B";24 and (iv) reorganizing the Commission Directorate General
responsible for competition enforcement, DG-IV, to provide an accelerated and more consistent decision-making process. 25 While these changes
have created a more efficient process that brings greater clarity to the
competition rules, they do not provide a wholly satisfactory response to
21. See Commission Document IV/368/90-EN, Application of Articles 85 and 86 by
National Courts, Annex 2 at 2 [hereinafter Commission Document] (on file with
author).
22. Comfort letters are informal non-binding administrative letters from the Commission indicating that the file has been closed on the notified agreement because it
does not infringe Article 85(1) or Article 86, or because an agreement falling within
Article 85(1) would be eligible for exemption under Article 85(3). Comfort letters provide an expedited but legally uncertain mechanism for parties to ascertain the compatibility of the notified agreements with EU competition laws. SeeJoined Cases 253/78 &
1-3/79, Procureur de la R~publique v. Giry, 1980 E.C.R. 2327, 2373-74; Case 99/79,
Lanc6me v. Etos, 1980 E.C.R. 2511, 2532-33; Case 31/80, L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe AMCK,
1980 E.C.R. 3775, 3788-90.
23. A block exemption permits an agreement falling within the provisions of Article
85(1) to be automatically exempt pursuant to Article 85(3), provided the agreement
falls
within the criteria set forth in the block exemption regulation. Both the Commission and the national courts may determine whether the agreement comports with the
requirements of the block exemption regulation. Block exemptions expedite the process of determining an agreement's compatibility with Article 85, but limit the parties'
contractual freedom by forcing agreements to be fashioned so as to comply with the socalled "white" list of acceptable contractual provisions enumerated in the block exemption. See Case 59/77, De Bloos v. Bouyer, 1977 E.C.R. 2359, 2370; Case 170/83,
Hydrotherm v. Compact, 1984 E.C.R. 2999, 3013; Case 10/86, VAG France v. Magne,
1986 E.C.R. 4071, 4088-89. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1983/83 of 22 June 1993
on the Application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Distribution
Agreements, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1; Commission Regulation 1984/83 of 22June 1983 on
the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Purchasing
Agreements, 1983 Oj. (L 173) 5; Commission Regulation 4087/88 of 30 November
1988 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Franchise Agreements, 1988 O.J. (L 359) 46.
24. Form A/B is a special form used to apply for an Article 85(3) exemption or to
seek confirmation that the agreement does not run afoul of Article 85(1) or Article 86
(so-called "negative clearance"). Form A/B, as revised, requires, inter alia, full details
of the agreement, a description of the market, and information about the business,
turnover, and market shares of the parties. WYA-r & DAs-woOD, supra note 16, at 43234; CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION

487 (3d ed. 1987).
25. See Peeters, supra note 17, at 540; James S. Venit, Slouching Towards Bethlehem:
The Role ofReason and Notification in EECAntitrust Law, 10 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 17,

41 (1987).
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the delays created by the centralization of power and the Commission's
lack of adequate resources. 26 As a result, the Commission has proposed
alternative solutions.
One such proposed change calls for greater national court enforcement of EU competition laws. Since the 1980s, the Commission has
sought to reinforce the role national courts play in the enforcement of EU
competition rules.27 As the Commission indicated in its Thirteenth Report
on Competition Policy, "[t]he Commission believes it desirable that the judicial enforcement of Article [sic] 85 and 86 should also include the award of
damages to injured parties, because this would render Community law
more effective." 28 In the Commission's view, national court enforcement
would lead to fuller application and use of EU competition laws, provide
an expedited and efficient means to challenge infringements, and reduce
the Commission's responsibilities, permitting it to handle its caseload
29
more effectively.
Despite the Commission's professed desire to encourage national
courts to provide remedies to litigants seeking protection of Union rights,
efforts to do so have thus far proven unsuccessful. 30 Progress is difficult
because national courts are currently unable fully to apply and enforce the
EU competition rules prohibiting unlawful restraints of trade in the Com26. According to one authority, the Commission's lack of adequate resources and
its requirement for a fully reasoned opinion on each Article 85(3) request for exemption results in an average delay of two to three years. BELLAw & CHiLD, supra note 24,
at 135, (citing, e.g., Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra, 1988 OJ. 1987 (41 L) 31 (2 years, 4
months); Boussois/Interpane, 1987 O.J. (50 L) 30 (2 years, 3 months)).
27. See Commission of the European Communities, Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy 38 (1986); Commission of the European Communities, Sixteenth Report
on Competition Policy 9 41-42 (1987). Since the prohibitions of Article 85 and 86 are
directly effective, private parties may raise a violation of these articles before national
courts within the European Union. As Articles 85(1) and 86 tend by their very nature
to produce direct effects in relations between individuals, these Articles create direct
rights for the individuals concerned, rights which national courts must safeguard. See
Case 127/73, BRT v. SABAM, 1974 E.C.R. 51, 62. Moreover, the Court ofJustice in Van
Gend en Loos envisioned that national courts would serve as instruments to secure compliance with Union obligations, producing direct effects and creating individual rights.
Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R1 1, 12-13 (the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for
the benefit of which states have limited sovereign rights, and subjects of which comprise
not only Member States but also their nationals; it follows that, according to the spirit,
general scheme, and wording of the Treaty, Article 12 must be interpreted as producing direct effects and creating individual rights which national courts must protect).
28. Commission of the European Communities, Thirteenth Report on Competition
Policy, 217 (1984).
29. According to the Commission, more frequent national court application
reminds private citizens that competition provisions are part of the law of each Member
State, leading to fuller acceptance and use of such provisions. Decentralized application provides an expedited and efficient means to challenge infringements and provide
legal security, and reinforcing the role of national courts reduces the Commission's
responsibility, thus permitting the Commission to handle its caseload more rapidly and
effectively. See Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 27, 39.
30. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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mon Market. 31 Although national courts may ascertain whether a given
agreement violates Article 85(1) and may determine whether an agreement falls within the terms of an Article 85(3) block exemption, 32 they
may not grant an individual exemption under Article 85(3). 33 Moreover,
their power to apply Article 85(1) and Article 86 is lost as soon as the
Commission initiates any negative clearance, termination of infringement
proceeding, or exemption procedure.3 4 As a result, the Commission's
Article 85(3) exemption decision may effectively preclude a final national
court ruling.3 5 That is, a negative national court decision under Article
85(1) and (2) voiding an agreement and a positive Commission decision
exempting the same agreement under Article 85(3) would, as the Commission described it, amount to a material injustice.3 6 Accordingly, the
Court ofJustice has ruled that national courts may not make a finding of
nullity during the period between notification and the date on which the
Commission takes a decision.3 7 Given such difficulties, it is not surprising
that the overwhelming majority of competition law proceedings are
brought before the Commission, not national courts, 8 and more importantly, no plaintiff has ever been awarded damages for an EU competition
39
law infringement by a Member State court.
Finally, ambiguities remain as to the proper course national courts
should take when faced with new pro-competitive agreements which
31. Christine Boch & Robert Lane, European Community Law in National Courts: A
Continuing Contradiction,5 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 171, 171 (1992).
32. See Case 170/83, Hydrotherm v. Compact, 1984 E.C.R. 2999, 3013; Case 59/77,
De Bloos v. Bouyer, 1977 E.C.R. 2359, 2370; Case 63/75, Fonderies Roubaix v.
Fonderies Roux, 1976 E.C.R. 111, 118; Commission of the European Communities,
Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy 1 109-18 (1990).
33. Regulation 17, supra note 13, art. 9(1), at 89; Case 31/80, L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe
AMCK, 1980 E.C.R. 3775, 3792.
34. See Regulation 17, supra note 13, art. 2 (negative clearance), art. 3 (termination
of infringements), art. 6 (exemption); WYATr & DAsmvooD, supra note 16, at 446.
35. See Case 48/72, Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin (No. 2), 1973 E.C.R. 77, 87
(national courts have discretion to suspend proceedings in order to obtain the Commission's standpoint); Case 14/68, Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1, 13-15
(where, during national proceedings it appears possible that decision to be taken by
Commission at culmination of procedure still in progress concerning same agreement
may conflict with effects of decision of national authorities, it is for latter to take appropriate measures).
36. See Commission Document, supra note 21, at 2-3.
37. See Case 59/77, De Bloos v. Bouyer, 1977 E.C.R. 2359, 2370 (Article 85(3)
exemption system is inconsistent with jurisdiction of the national courts to make a finding of nullity during the period between notification and the date on which the Commission takes a decision).
38. Although a majority of European lawyers appear to believe that claims in
national courts are possible, relatively few have been brought. SeeJohn Temple Lang,
EEC Competition Actions in Member States' Courts-Claimsfor Damages, Declarations and
Injunctionsfor Breach of Community Antitrust Law, 7 FoRDHA
INT'L L.J. 389, 407 (1984).
39. Mark Hoskins, Garden CottageRevisited: The Availability of Damages in the National
CourtsforBreaches oftheEEC CompetitionRules, 13 EUR. CoMp. L. PEv. 257, 258 (1992) (no
reported decision in which national court has actually made an award); Jacobs, supra
note 14, at 1364 (although Member State courts have frequently applied EC competition laws, there has not been a single case in which a plaintiff has recovered damages).
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clearly warrant an Article 85(3) exemption. Because of the likelihood that
such agreements would profit from an Article 85(3) exemption, national
courts are reluctant to prohibit such agreements pursuant to Article 85(1)
and to annul them pursuant to Article 85(2).40
Given these difficulties, some clarification of the role of national
courts within the Article 85 framework was essential. The Court ofJustice
faced these precise issues in the 1973 landmark decision of Brasserie de
Haeclht (No. 2).41 In the case of what the Court called "old agreements"
(entered into before Regulation 17 became effective on March 13,
1962),42 the Court reasoned that the general principle of contractual certainty requires that the national court automatically void an agreement
only after the Commission has taken a decision by virtue of the Regulation. 43 Thus, an old agreement which is either properly notified or nonnotifiable must be treated by national courts as "provisionally valid" unless
and until the Commission has made an Article 85 (3) decision on the matter and refused to grant an exemption. 4 4 However, the Court held this
not to be the case with respect to "new agreements" entered into after
Regulation 17 became effective. As for such new agreements, national
courts must assume that, as long as the Commission has not taken an Article 85 (3) decision on the matter, the agreement can only be implemented
at the parties' own risk because the agreement may run afoul of Article
85(1). 'As the Court noted,
[w]hilst the principle of legal certainty requires that, in applying the prohibidons of Article 85, the sometimes considerable delays by the Commission in
exercising its powers should be taken into account, this cannot, however,
absolve the Court from the obligation of deciding
on the claims of inter45
ested parties who invoke the automatic nullity.
Hence, for such new agreements, notification to the Commission does not
46

have suspensive effect.

Thus, Brasserie de Haecht (No. 2) does not resolve the conundrum facing national courts of prohibiting and nullifying pro-competitive restraints
of trade. Furthermore, given the practical difficulties of the Commission
rendering formal decisions, 47 the prospect of suspending national court
proceedings until the Commission has taken a position on the agreement
40. Commission Document, supra note 21, at 2-3.
41. Case 48/72, SA Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin-Janssen (No. 2), 1973 E.C.R. 77.
42. See Regulation 17, supra note 13.
43. See Case 48/72, SA Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin-Janssen (No. 2), 1973 EC.R.
77, 86-87.
44. Case 59/77, De Bloos v. Bouyer, 1977 E.C.R. 2359, 2370 (national courts before
which proceedings are brought relating to an old agreement duly notified or exempted
from notification must give such an agreement the legal effects attributed thereto
under the applicable law); Case 99/79, Lanc6me v. Etos, 1980 E.C.R. 2511, 2533-35
(maintenance of provisional protection, from which notified old agreements benefit, is
no longerjustified from the date the Commission informs parties concerned that it has
decided to close their file); WYATr & DAsMVOOD, supra note 16, at 449.
45. Brasserie de Haecht (No. 2), 1973 E.C.R. at 87.
46. Id.
47. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol 27

is becoming increasingly untenable. Some further elucidation regarding
the balance of power between the national courts and the Commission was
thus necessary.
To clarify these matters, the European Court ofJustice and the Court
of First Instance have recently made important pronouncements concerning national court enforcement of EU competition laws. In Sergios Delimitis
v. HenningerBrdu, the Court ofJustice addressed the relationship between
the Commission and national courts regarding the application of Articles
85 and 86, and articulated the instances in which national court enforcement is appropriate. 48 In Automec v. Commission, the Court of First
Instance upheld the Commission's refusal to investigate a complaint
49
where an adequate remedy could be obtained in the national courts,
thus underscoring the preference for national court enforcement of EU
competition laws when adequate. As further developed below, these decisions promote and give content to subsidiarity in the competition law
context.
B.

Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Br-u AG

Delimitis arose out of litigation in Germany concerning a tavern operator
and his exclusive purchase agreement with a brewer.5 0 The tavern operator brought the action before a national court seeking recovery of sums
deducted from a security deposit covering costs associated with the termination. 5 ' Pursuant to an Article 177 reference, 5 2 the Court ofJustice held
that individual exclusive purchase agreements must have a restrictive
5
effect in and of themselves to fall within the scope of Article 85(1). 3
More importantly for our purposes was the Court's discussion of the relationship between national courts and the Commission concerning the
application of the Treaty's competition rules.
While the Court underscored the right of the Commission to grant
individual exemptions under Article 85(3), it noted that Member State
courts have jurisdiction to enforce Articles 85(1) and 86 and, in appropriate circumstances, may apply the block exemptions pursuant to Article
85(3) .54 Acknowledging that the concurrent competence of the Commission and Member State courts could lead to legal uncertainty due to conflicting results in the application of Articles 85(1) and 86, the Court
enumerated several factors that a national court should consider in exer48. Case C-234/89, Delimitis v. Henninger Br5u AG, 1991 E.C.R. 1-935.
49. Case T-24/90, Automec Srl. v. E.C. Commission, 5 C.M.L.R. 431 (1992).
50. Delimitis, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-939 to 1-940.
51. Id.
52. Under Article 177, a national court may request the Court of Justice to give a
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Treaty or the validity and interpretation
of acts of Union institutions if such a preliminary ruling is necessary to enable the
national court to give proper judgment in a case pending before it. EEC TREry, art.

177.
53. Delimitis, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-986 to 1-987.
54. Id. at 1-991 to 1-992.
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cising its jurisdiction.55
First, the Court drew a distinction between clearly prohibited agreements and those that may be granted an individual exemption by the
Commission pursuant to Article 85(3).56 According to the Court, if the
conditions for application of Article 85(1) are clearly not met, the Member State may freely rule on the application of Article 85(1), including the
nullity provision of Article 85(2). 57 This also applies in instances where
prior notification is a precondition to an exemption and such notification
was not given.
If, on the other hand, there is a possibility that the Commission would
grant an exemption, the national court must act cautiously. In the case
where a failure to notify is not a precondition to an Article 85(3) exemption, 58 and where an agreement could benefit from such an exemption,
the national court could suspend its proceedings or take provisional measures until the Commission has either granted or rejected application of an
Article 85(3) exemption. 59 The Court implied that if the agreement is
one that could benefit from an exemption, the national court should not
declare the agreement void in the absence of Commission action. 60 Similarly, in complex cases under Articles 85(1) or 86, the national court can
61
ask the Commission to make submissions on economic or legal matters
or ultimately seek guidance from the Court ofJustice by way of an Article
62
177 reference.
Though not explicitly presented in this fashion, Delimitis essentially
places competition cases along a continuum according to the complexity
of the issues raised. Where the cases present rather pedestrian and
straightforward questions, the national courts should enforce Articles
85(1) and 86 with little or no involvement by the Commission. Where the
cases raise novel or complex issues, the Court envisions the role of the
national courts to decrease proportionately and the Commission's role to
increase. In complex cases, submissions from the Commission to the
55. Id. at 1-993.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 1-993 to 1-994.
58. An example is the case where an agreement does not involve imports or exports
between Member States. Id. at 1-993; see also Case 43/69, Bilger v. Jehle, 1970 E.C.R.
127.
59. Delimitis, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-994; Case 48/72, Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilken-Janssen (No. 2), 1973 E.C.R. 77, 87 (national court has discretion to suspend proceedings
in order to obtain the Commission's standpoint).
60. A national court may not extend the scope of the block exemption to supply
agreements which do not explicitly meet conditions for exemption laid down in that
regulation, nor may it declare Article 85 (1) inapplicable to such agreement under Article 85(3). It may, however, declare the agreement void under Article 85(2) if it is certain that the agreement could not be the subject of an exemption decision under
Article 85(3). Delimitis, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-994.
61. Id. The Commission has the obligation, pursuant to Article 5 of the Treaty, to
provide effective assistance to national courts charged with enforcement of the competition rules. Id. (citing Case C-2/88, J.J. Zwartveld and Others, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3365, 13372).
62. Delimitis, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-994.
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national courts are appropriate. In highly complex cases, an Article 177
reference is encouraged, thus taking the interpretation of Article 85(1)
completely out of the hands of the national courts.
Thus, in the Court's view, there is a class of highly complex cases with
which only the Commission may deal. One Commission official has
included in this category, inter alia, cases (i) where corporations have
allegedly infringed the Treaty in two or more Member States; (ii) where
the economic issues are difficult or the final remedy has far-reaching
impact requiring effective uniformity throughout the Common Market;
(iii) where governments, state enterprises, and state measures are
involved; or (iv) where mergers or joint ventures are involved, especially
when divestiture in more than one Member State is at issue. 63
Delimitis suggests that national court enforcement will not serve as an
effective tool of competition law except in uncomplicated cases. In effect,
the Court's judgment minimizes previously expressed concerns of conflicting and disuniform application of competition rules, precisely because
national courts are urged to tread with caution whenever a case involves
complex issues. Unfortunately, by narrowly defining the role of national
courts, Delimitis undercuts the effective role national courts will play in
enforcing EU competition rules. The decision ensures that third party
actions for damages before national courts will continue to be less attractive to complainants than recourse to the Commission.
On the other hand, Delimitis reinforces the role of national courts in
enforcing straightforward cases of Article 85(1) infringements. In
essence, national courts are free to apply Article 85(1) in contexts akin to
per se prohibitions under the U.S. Sherman Act such as naked price fixing, market sharing, and collective boycotts. Such agreements are, to
quote the United States Supreme Court, so "plainly anticompetitive that
no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality."6 4
In EU competition law, such per se prohibitions could include the five
types of agreements explicitly mentioned in Article 85(1).65 Because such
agreements are unlikely to bring any benefits either to consumers or the
economy, national courts may freely enforce Article 85(1) and the nullity
provisions of Article 85(2).66
Having considered how the Court in Delimitis effectively confined the
role of national courts to uncomplicated cases of clear Article 85(1)
63. SeeJohn Temple Lang, EEC Competition Actions in Member States' Courts-Claims
for Damages,Declarationsand Injunctionsfor Breach of Community Antitrust Law, 1983 FoRDHAm CoRP. L. INsT. 219, 246-47 (Barry Hawk ed., 1984).
64. National Soc'y of Professional Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
65. These include agreements that fix purchase or selling prices; limit or control
production, markets, technical developments, or investment; share markets or sources
of supply; apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions; and those that make
the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary
obligations that have no connection with the subject of such contracts. EEC TR.AY,
art. 85(1).
66. Valentine Korah, The Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity-The Need for a Rule of
Reason in EECAntitrust, 3 Nw.J. I, r'L L. & Bus. 320, 340-41 (1981); EEC TRFAy, art. 85.
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infringements, we turn now to another decision, Automec v. Commission,
which is illustrative of an uncomplicated Article 85(1) infringement proceeding, and examine the Court of First Instance's understanding of the
appropriate action of the Commission when considering whether to refer
infringement actions to the national courts.
C.

Automec Srl. v. E.C. Commission

In Automec, an Italian motor car distributor, Automec Srl. (Automec),
entered into an agreement with BMW Italia, Spa (BMW Italia) for the distribution of BMW cars in the city and province of Treviso, Italy. When
BMW Italia failed to renew its distribution agreement with Automec,
Automec sued in an Italian court to obtain an order requiring the continuation of the contractual relationship. The Tribunale di Milano rejected
the application and Automec appealed to the Corte d'Appello. While the
appeal was pending, Automec, on January 25, 1988, made an application
to the Commission requesting that it order BMW Italia to discontinue its
infringement of Article 85 and appoint Automec as a distributor. After an
informal exchange of views on the matter, the Commission, on February
28, 1990, formally rejected Automec's application. The Commission
informed Automec, inter alia, that (i) the Commission lacked the power
to issue an injunction compelling BMW to supply its products to Automec;
(ii) the Italian court had the same power as the Commission to apply Article 85, particularly the declaration of nullity provision under Article 85 (2);
(iii) the national courts had the additional power to order BMW to pay
damages in the event of an infringement; and (iv) in light of the discretionary power of the Commission to accord different degrees of priority to
matters referred to it, the Commission concluded that there was not a
sufficient Community interest to justify a more detailed investigation of
67
the matter.
On appeal, the Court of First Instance upheld the Commission's decision, holding that the Commission is not obligated to launch an investigation or take a decision concerning the substance of a complaint. Of
particular importance for our purposes was the Court's discussion of the
right of the Commission to accord different degrees of priority to the complaints it receives in order to further the Union's interests. The Court of
First Instance noted that
unlike the civil courts, whose task is to safeguard the subjective rights of
private persons in their mutual relations, an administrative authority must
act in the public interest. Consequently, it is legitimate for the Commission
the degree of
to refer to the Community interest in order to determine
68
priority to be accorded to the different matters before it.

Accordingly, given the extensive supervisory and regulatory authority
assigned to the Commission in the field of competition, the allocation by
the Commission of different degrees of priority to the competition matters
67. Case T-24/90, Automec Srl. v. E.C. Commission, 5 C.M.L.R. 431,463-64 (1992).
68. Id. at 479.
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referred to it was found to be compatible with its obligations under Union
law.
In assessing the Union interest, the Commission must take into
account all of the particular legal and factual aspects of the complaint.
The Court reasoned that the Commission must examine (i) the importance of the alleged infringement for the functioning of the Common
Market, (ii) the probability of being able to establish the existence of an
infringement, and (iii) the extent of investigative measures necessary to
fulfill successfully its task of securing compliance with the EU's competition laws. 69 The question, then, was whether the Commission was correct
in concluding that there was not a sufficient Union interest in pursuing
the matter, given that Automec had already referred the dispute to the
Italian courts, and given that it could likewise submit to those courts the
question of the compatibility of that termination with Article 85(1). The
Court concluded that the Commission was correct in refusing to launch
such an investigation.
The Court noted that, in the instant case, the Commission did not
refuse to launch an investigation merely because a national court had concurrentjurisdiction. Rather, Automec had already referred an associated
dispute concerning BMW Italia's distribution system to the Italian courts.
In determining whether national court remedies would be adequate, the
Court examined the extent of protection afforded by national courts in
safeguarding the rights provided in Article 85(1). As previously discussed
in Delimitis, the Court emphasized that Articles 85(1) and 86 have direct
effect in the national courts such that individuals may rely on the rights
provided therein in actions before the national court. In ensuring these
rights, the national court must examine whether there has been an Article
85(1) infringement, and if so, whether that infringement enjoys an Article
85(3) block exemption pursuant to, for example, Regulation 123/85 per70
taining to motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements.
If the national court has some doubt as to the validity of the action
under Article 85(1) or the application of the Article 85(3) block exemption to the instant facts, the Court underscored the national court's prerogative to make an Article 177 reference to the Court ofJustice. On the
other hand, if the national court determines there to be an infringement
of Article 85(1) falling outside the Article 85(3) block exemption, it does
not have the power to order an end to the infringement or impose fines
on the responsible party. It does, however, have the power to declare the
action void pursuant to Article 85(2), and the Court considered this remedy sufficient. As the Court stated:
[T]he Treaty postulates that national law gives the court power to preserve
the rights of enterprises which are victims of anti-competitive practices. In
the present case the applicant has produced nothing to indicate that Italian
69. Id.
70. Commission Regulation 123/85 of 12 December 1984 Concerning Motor Vehicle Distribution and Servicing Agreements, 1985 OJ. (L 15) 16.
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law provides no legal remedy which would
enable the Italian court to safe71
guard its rights in a satisfactory manner.
Thus, under the circumstances of the case, the Court ruled that judicial
economy and administrative justice "militate in favour of examination of
the matter by the [national] court already dealing with the associated
72
questions."
It should be underscored that the Court in Automec held that the
national court remedies were adequate. In this respect, however, the facts
of Automec are somewhat uncommon. First, Automec had already brought
suit in national court for a violation of the distribution agreement such
that there was no concern that Automec's claim would be time barred
under a Member State's statute of limitations. Second, the nature of
Automec's complaint was problematic: Automec sought a decision from
the Commission finding that BMW Italia had violated Article 85 (1) and an
order requiring BMW Italia to continue its contractual relations with
Automec. While the Commission did not have the power to grant the
requested action, the national court did have such power and, significantly, could order BMW Italia to pay damages if it violated the terms of
the distribution agreement. Finally, in proceeding before the national
court, the court could, in addition to considering whether there was an
Article 85(1) infringement, also apply Article 85(3) because a block
exemption applied to motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements. 73 The frequent complaint that national court remedies are inadequate because they cannot grant individual exemptions pursuant to
Article 85 (3) therefore did not arise.
Automec makes explicit what was implicit in Delimitis: the Commission
and the national courts will increasingly share enforcement responsibilities, and national courts can serve as an effective tool for enforcing competition laws in uncomplicated cases. It also confirms that, in contrast to its
previous monopolistic approach to competition law enforcement, the
Commission will now only act when it is assured that its involvement will
further significant Union policies. Thus, Automec is significant because it
represents one of the first times the Commission has deferred to national
court enforcement on the grounds that such enforcement was sufficient to
protect the complainant's and the Union's interest.
Automec is perhaps most significant for its four-fold test articulating
the criteria for determining when and whether the Commission should
launch an investigation. This test requires the Commission to (i) confirm
that there is a sufficient Union interest, (ii) determine whether there is
some probability of successfully finding an infringement, (iii) give due
consideration to the effort required to establish the existence of Article
85(1) infringement, and (iv) verify the existence of adequate national
71. Automec, 5 C.M.L.R. at 481.
72. Id. at 480.
73. Commission Regulation 123/85 of 12 December 1984 Concerning Motor Vehicle Distribution and Servicing Agreements, 1985 OJ. (L 15) 16.
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court remedies. 74 This formulation, though imprecise, marks the first
articulation by the Court of when the Commission should defer to the
national courts in enforcing competition laws. 7 5
The significance of the Automec criteria is all the more evident given
that the Commission has indicated that it will utilize this approach in
processing all future EU competition infringement complaints. As Sir
Leon Brittan stated:
In the Automec v. Commissionjudgment, the Court of First Instance has confirmed that the Commission may, where redress is available at the national
level, reject a complaint on grounds of lack of Community interest. I propose therefore that this judgment be used as the basis of the Commission's
policy with regard to complaints. Where there is no important Community
interest at stake, either in economic terms or in relation to important questions of legal precedent, and redress is available at [the] national level
because appropriate legal instruments exist to undertake the necessary factfinding and order any necessary remedies, the complainant will be referred
76
to the Member State in question.
The announcement of this new approach in the Commission's enforcement thus represents a ringing endorsement of subsidiarity in EU competition law policy.
In sum, Automec is notable because it requires the Commission to
apply the principles of subsidiarity in competition enforcement, it defines
the circumstances under which the Commission will defer to national
courts in the enforcement of EU competition laws, and it is representative
of an uncomplicated case that could easily be resolved by a national court
without assistance from the Commission. It also emphasizes that when
complaints raise few questions of significant interest to the Union, the
Commission will increasingly refer the matter to the national courts for
resolution. Such a development marks a welcome change toward greater
power sharing between the Commission and the national courts in the
enforcement of EU competition laws.
Nevertheless, while Automec confirms the Union's commitment to the
decentralized enforcement of EU competition laws, its focus was limited to
the Commission's authority to defer enforcement action to the national
courts. The decision did not, however, provide any guidelines for national
courts to follow when seized with an EU competition law infringement
action. Thus, Automec does not resolve the uncertainties and ambiguities
74. Automec, 5 C.M.L.R. at 479-81.
75. In a significant development, on September 7, 1993 a French court sought clari-

fication through an Article 177 reference from the European Court of Justice as to

whether the Commission, when invoking the principle of subsidiarity to refer EU competition law complaints to national courts, has the sole prerogative to define what is in
the "[Union] interest" in any given case. Case C-378/93, La Pyramide SarI, 1993 OJ. (C
243). The Court's ruling in La Pyramide Sarlwill hopefully clarify whether the Commission has the exclusive right to determine whether a complaint should be handled at the

national or the Union level.
76. Brittan Speech, supra note 7, at 3.
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regarding how national courts should proceed when seized of an action
alleging infringement of Articles 85 and 86.
Automeds articulation of when, and on what basis, an infringement
action should be referred to national courts foreshadowed a day when the
Union would provide intelligible guidelines for national courts to follow
when seized with an EU competition infringement action. That day came
only a few months later with the publication of the Commission's Notice
77
on Cooperation with National Courts in Applying Articles 85 and 86.
H.

National Court Procedures in Enforcing Competition Laws: The
Notice on Cooperation with National Courts in Applying
Articles 85 and 86

On February 13, 1993 the Commission published its Notice on Cooperation with National Courts in Applying Articles 85 and 86.78 The Notice
summarizes the respective powers of the Union and the national courts in
enforcing EU competition laws. Significantly, it removes all doubt that the
Commission is committed to the decentralized application of EU competition laws in fidelity to the principle of subsidiarity. As Commissioner Brittan stated:
[T]he Commission is seeking to further encourage the enforcement of Articles 85(1) and 86 by National Courts. [Accordingly, b] efore the end of this
year I shall propose to the Commission the adoption of a Notice that will
clarify the rights and obligations of National Courts in Articles 85 and 86
cases. This Notice will explain that the Commission... intends to play a
pro-active role in encouraging and assisting National Courts in applying
Community law... This Notice, combined with our policy of dealing with
complaints only where they raise issues that cannot adequately be addressed
in National Courts, should provide a catalyst leading to wider implementa79
tion of the Community competition rules at the national level.
The Notice, in many respects, is the crystallization of the Union's
commitment to apply the principle of subsidiarity in enforcing competition laws. Whereas Delimitisand Automec attempted to clarify the nature of
cooperation between the national courts and the Commission given their
concurrent power to enforce EU competition laws, the Notice provides
both the purposes and the procedures to be followed by national courts in
enforcing EU competition rules. This synthesis of a coherent policy and
effective procedures enhances the impact that the Notice will have on the
future of national court competition enforcement.
A.

Rationale for Decentralized Application of Competition Laws

According to the Commission's Notice, there are two underlying policies
for the decentralized application of competition laws. First, the Commission is "obliged, in general, to take all organizational measures necessary
77. Notice on Cooperation, supranote 8.
78. Id. at 6.
79. Brittan Speech, supranote 7, at 4.
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for the performance of its task and, in particular, to establish priorities."8 0
Complaints that do not "serve the Community's general interest" should,
the Commission maintains, be handled by national courts.8 ' Since the
administrative resources of the Union are necessarily limited and cannot
be used to deal with all cases brought to its attention, the Commission will
concentrate on notifications, complaints and "own-initiative proceedings"
that have particular political, economic, or legal significance for the
Union. 82 In determining whether complaints are of a sufficient significance for the Commission's investigation, however, the Commission will
also examine whether plaintiffs have adequate protection of their rights
83
before national courts.
The Commission's second rationale for encouraging the decentralized application of EU competition rules is the national court's objective
to protect the rights of private parties and the procedural benefits that
private parties enjoy before national courts that they do not enjoy at the
Union level. In the Commission's view, it is the national courts, not the
Commission, that must safeguard the subjective rights of private individuals in their relations with one another and ensure that the competition
rules are respected in protecting those rights. 84 In defending these sub-

jective rights of individuals, the Commission underscored the fact that
actions brought before national courts have significant advantages for
complainants compared to complaints lodged before the Commission.
These advantages include the national courts' ability (i) to award damages
for injury resulting from a violation of EU competition laws; (ii) to expeditiously adopt interim measures and otherwise order illegal activities to
cease; (iii) to hear concurrent claims brought under EU competition laws
and national competition laws; and (iv) to award legal costs under the laws
85
of certain Member States.
B. National Court Procedures in Enforcing EU Competition Laws
Having explained why it is in the Union's interest to encourage national
court enforcement of competition laws, the Notice continues with its most
significant section outlining the procedures that national courts should
follow in enforcing the competition rules. In brief outline, the Commission's Notice provides guidelines for national courts to follow when making a determination as to the applicability of Article 85(1) or the
likelihood of an Article 85(3) exemption.
According to the Commission's Notice, the first question that
national courts must answer is whether the particular action at issue
80. Notice on Cooperation, supra note 8, at 7 (citing Case T-24/90, Automec Srl. v.
E.G. Commission, 5 C.M.L.R. 431, 477-78 (1992)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. "The Commission considers that there is not normally a sufficient Community
interest in examining a case when the plaintiff is able to secure adequate protection of
his rights before the national courts." Id. at 7.
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id. at 8.
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infringes the prohibitions laid down in Article 85(1) or Article 86.86 The
most obvious means to determine whether an infringement has taken
place is to inquire whether the activity has already been the subject of a
decision or opinion by the Commission. A formal ruling by the Commission is authoritative for the national courts. When, however, the Commission's decision is a non-binding opinion, such as a comfort letter, the
Commission's decision constitutes only a factor for the national courts to
87
consider in examining whether an infringement has occurred.
If the Commission has not ruled on the particular activity, the
national courts should seek guidance from the case law of the Court of
Justice, the decisions of the Commission, and the general notices issued by
the Commission.8 8 The Notice envisages that national courts will decide
whether the conduct is compatible with Article 85(1) and Article 86 on
the basis of these opinions and decisions. 8 9 Thus, it is assumed that in the
majority of cases the national courts will be able to determine whether an
Article 85(1) or 86 infringement has occurred simply by applying the facts
of the particular case to the laws set forth in the case law of the Court of
Justice and the Commission.
If the national court determines that the "conditions for applying
Article 85(1) or Article 86 are not met," the courts should "pursue their
proceedings on the basis of such a finding, even if the agreement, decision
or concerted practice at issue has been notified to the Commission." 90
Thus, if the agreement does not infringe Article 85(1) or Article 86, the
national court may treat the agreement as valid. By contrast, if the
national court finds that the conditions for applying Articles 85(1) and
Article 86 are met, the national courts must "rule that the conduct at issue
infringes Community competition law and take the appropriate measures,
including those relating to the consequences that attach to infringement
9
of a statutory prohibition under the civil law applicable." '
Thus, if Article 85(1) is infringed, absent an Article 85(3) exemption,
the Notice requires that national courts declare the agreement automatically void pursuant to Article 85(2) and apply the relevant national civil
penalties to the infringement. Before doing so, however, the national
court must first determine whether the infringement enjoys an individual
or block exemption pursuant to Article 85 (3). Where the Commission has
either formally, through an individual Article 85(3) exemption, or informally, through a comfort letter, rendered a decision, the national court
86. Id.
87. Id. For a discussion of comfort letters, see supra note 22; Joined Cases 253/78
and 1-3/79, Procureur de la R~publique v. Giry, 1980 E.C.R. 2327, 2373-74; Case 99/79,
Lancfme v. Etos, 1980 E.C.R. 2511, 2532-33; Case 31/80, L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe AMCK,

1980 E.C.R. 3775, 3788-90.
88. See, e.g., Notice on Co-operation Agreements, 1968 OJ. (C 75) 3, reprinted in 2
C.M.L.R. D5 (Supp. 1968); Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, 1968 OJ. (C
231) 2.
89. Notice on Cooperation, supra note 8, at 8.
90. Id. at 8-9.
91. Id. at 9.

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 27

must respect this decision and find that conduct compatible with EU competition law. By contrast, if the agreement falls within a block exemption,
the conduct is "automatically exempt" and the national court must apply
92
the exemption to the activity.
If there has been no Commission decision on the matter and no
applicable block exemption, however, the national courts must tread with
caution. Before finding an Article 85(1) infringement, the court must
consider the possibility of the Commission granting an Article 85(3) individual exemption to an agreement that has been duly notified.93 If the
court can determine from the existing case law of the Court ofJustice and
the Commission that an exemption cannot be granted, the court can take
the appropriate action in response to an Article 85(1) infringement and
apply the relevant Union and national penalties. Where the court determines that an exemption is possible, however, it must suspend its proceedings and adopt whatever interim measures are necessary while awaiting the
Commission's decision.9 4 Cases that have been suspended in this fashion
will be given priority by the Commission to avoid undue delay. 95 If a suspension is necessary to determine the applicability of an exemption, the
Notice indicates that the court can expect the cooperation from the Commission in resolving specific issues. Such assistance may include information regarding procedural matters, customary practices of the
Commission, substantive points of law, and non-binding interim opinions
96
on the likelihood of an exemption.
Finally, where national courts face particularly complex questions
concerning the application of Articles 85 and 86, they may, rather than
suspending proceedings to procure assistance from the Commission, refer
cases to the Court ofJustice pursuant to Article 177 for a formal ruling on
the matter. This requires the suspension of proceedings before the
national court and a lengthy delay pending the Court ofJustice's decision.

M.

The Impact of Recent Developments: The Application of
Subsidiarity to EU Competition Law Enforcement

Delimitis, Automec, and the Notice on Cooperation confirm that the longstanding presumption that the Commission must examine all agreements
to ensure their compatibility with EU competition laws is increasingly
becoming a rule in search of a rationale. The Commission currently finds
it impossible in practice to deal on an individual basis with more than a
92. See supra note 23.
93. In determining the likelihood that the Commission would grant such an
exemption, the national court must first ascertain whether the Commission has been
notified of the agreement. Absent such notification, there is no possibility of an Article
85(3) individual exemption, and therefore the national court may, pursuant to Article
85(2), declare the agreement void because it infringes Article 85(1). See Notice on
Cooperation, supra note 8, at 9.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 10.
96. Id.
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fraction of the Article 85(3) exemption requests it receives. 9 7 The notification process has come to be used less as a mechanism for approving
individual cases and more as a law-making tool, with the Commission typically ruling only on notifications that are of strategic importance in clarifying or developing the law. In the past, the Commission has attempted to
exercise a theoretically all-embracing but practically unworkable surveillance over an immense number of individual transactions, rather than taking a more strategic approach of formulating policy and concentrating its
efforts on carefully selected agreements98 where intervention is necessary
and effective or of far-reaching impact.
While the Commission has attempted to overhaul the administration
of the competition rules by issuing individual comfort letters and adopting
block exemption regulations, the Commission admits that these changes
have been only modestly successful. The practical consequence of the current procedural approach to Article 85(1) is that the great majority of
agreements that potentially or actually have an adverse impact on market
unity must be notified to the Commission or be excluded from the possibility of future exemption. While such centralization may have been justifiable in the course of the evolution of the Common Market, so as to
establish the Commission's central role in assessing restrictive agreements
and applying Article 85(1), such an approach is no longer warranted at
the current stage of development of EU competition law. Instead, the role
of the Commission should be less universal and more specialized, with a
cases of a general interfocus on formulating policy, prosecuting strategic
99
est, and drafting notices and regulations.
The recent decisions in Delimitis and Automec, as well as the Commission's Notice on Cooperation, confirm the EU's commitment to both strategic enforcement by the Commission and broader and more effective
enforcement by national courts. The renewed commitment to the decentralized application of competition laws ensures that national courts will
increasingly have a significant role in the enforcement of Articles 85 and
86. Moreover, such trends are wholly consistent with the EU's general
commitment to the principle of subsidiarity as embodied in Article 3b of
the Maastricht Treaty. As the Commission's Notice on Cooperation
emphasizes, there are distinct procedural and substantive advantages for
litigants who bring infringement actions before national courts. These
include monetary and injunctive relief, the ability to bring parallel claims
based on EU and national competitive legislation, and, in some instances,
the recoupment of litigation costs. Thus, from the perspective of the complainant, national court enforcement is a promising alternative, and such
incentives likely will result in an increase in the number of such claims.
However, this renewed commitment to subsidiarity masks a hidden
danger. Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty states:
97. See WYATr & DAsMWOOD, supia note 16, at 367.
98. Forrester & Norall, supra note 18, at 13-14, 17.
99. See id. at 38.
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In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the member-States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 10 0
Applied to competition law enforcement, the Union must uphold the concept of decentralized enforcement of EU competition laws to the extent
national courts can "sufficiently achieve the objectives" of Articles 85 and
86. In short, for subsidiarity to develop and thrive, national court enforcement of EU competition laws must be efficient, effective, and adequate as
an enforcement mechanism.
Of particular concern in this context is the risk of (i) contradictory
rulings between the Commission and the national courts, (ii) ineffective
relief in actions brought before national courts, and (iii) the legal uncertainty created by a national court Article 85(2) declaration of nullity pending the Commission's Article 85 (3) exemption decision. The first of these
issues appears to have been the Commission's primary concern in drafting
the Notice on Cooperation. The Notice expressly mentions this issue as
one of the primary evils concurrent jurisdiction creates. Indeed, it

appears that the Commission promulgated the Notice in large part to
avoid such a result. As the Commission noted:
[T]he direct effect of Article 85(1) and Article 86 gives national courts sufficient powers to comply with their obligation to hand downjudgment. Nevertheless, when exercising these powers they must take account of the
Commission's powers in order to avoid decisions which could conflict with
those taken or envisaged by the Commission in applying Article 85(1) and
Article 86, and also Article 85(3). In its case-law the Court of Justice has
developed a number of principles which make it possible for such contradictory decisions to be avoided.' 0 '
The Commission then sets forth, in great detail, the procedures that
national courts should follow in enforcing EU competition laws to avoid
such an eventuality. One may surmise that the Notice will largely alleviate
the concern of contradictory rulings between the national courts and the
Commission, provided the national courts follow the suggestions of the
Notice and consult the Commission during the litigation to confirm that
the Commission has not, or will not, render a contrary result. Nevertheless, there may be instances where a national court considers a matter so
clear that it need not consult the Commission but the Commission subsequently reviews the matter and reaches a contrary result. Thus, the recent
decisions in Delimitis and Automec, along with the Notice on Cooperation,
will encourage national court enforcement of EU competition laws while
minimizing the risk of contradictory rulings arising from such concurrent
jurisdiction.
The second issue concerning effective relief before the national court
relates to the general concern that the Commission should not refer a
100.
snucHT TREAr, art. 3b.
101. Notice on Cooperation, supra note 8, at 8.
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matter to national courts unless it can be assured that the national court,
in fact, has jurisdiction over the matter and can secure effective relief for
the complainant. Thus, unless the Commission can be assured that the
national law provides a legal remedy which would enable the national
court to safeguard the rights in a satisfactory manner, the Commission
should not refer the matter to the national courts. Advocate General, now
Judge, David Edward forcefully emphasized this concern in his opinion in
Autome
The availability of relief in the national courts is not a straightforward matter. The Commission cannot, in response to a genuine complaint, simply
repeat a ritual formula to the effect that relief is available in the national
courts. The Commission must apply its mind properly to the question
whether relief would indeed be available, or whether it has a duty to exer2
cise its own powers. 10
The Commission must, for example, be assured that a competent
national court exists to hear the complaint, that a national court is able to
provide interim measures beyond its national jurisdiction, that the
national court may obtain evidence in the territory of another Member
State, and that other courts may properly execute judicial requests for
assistance from the national court.10 3 In short, there are a number of
jurisdictional and procedural obstacles, unique to the extraterritorial context, that national courts face in assessing and enforcing violations of EU
competition rules. As Advocate General Edward correctly noted, the Commission should only reject complaints in favor of national court proceedings when it is reasonably assured that the national courts may effectively
safeguard the parties' interests.
Unfortunately, the Notice does not explicitly address concerns of ineffective relief before national courts. It merely states: "The Commission
considers that there is not normally a sufficient Community interest in
examining a case when the plaintiff is able to secure adequate protection
of his rights before the national courts." 10 4 The Notice does not address
what, in its view, "adequate protection" means. If the principle of subsidiarity is to be properly applied in the competition context, however, the
Commission must necessarily undertake a case-by-case analysis of each
complaint it receives to confirm that national court remedies are, in fact,
adequate. Anything short of this could result in decentralized application
of competition laws that will not properly safeguard the rights of the parties and will consequently subject the subsidiarity principle to criticism for
ineffective protection of the parties' legitimate interests.
102. Case T-24/90, Automec Sri. v. E.C. Commission, 5 C.M.L.R. 431, 459 (1992).
For a description of the role of the Advocate General under the Union judicial system,
see WYA-r & DASmvOOD, supra note 16, at 82-83; Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial
Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States and the European Community Approaches, 33
VA.J. INT'L L. 1, 30 n.149 (1992).
103. Automec, 5 C.M.L.R. at 458-59.
104. Notice on Cooperation, supra note 8, at 7.

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

VoL 27

Finally, regarding the concern for legal certainty, particularly when a
national court renders an Article 85(2) declaration of nullity and the
Commission subsequently grants an individual Article 85(3) exemption,
the Notice does not significantly improve the current impasse. The Notice
simply states:
Where the national court has... ascertained that the agreement, decision
or concerted practice at issue cannot be the subject of an individual exemption, it will take the measures necessary to comply with the requirements of
Article 85(1) and (2). On the other hand, if it takes the view that [an] individual exemption is possible, the national court should
suspend the pro10 5
ceedings while awaiting the Commission's decision.
Such a suggestion is nothing new and does not resolve the legal uncertainty the Article 85 framework creates. It does indicate, however, that the
Commission considers the legal uncertainty resulting from delays due to
national court suspension pending an Article 85(3) exemption decision to
be a lesser evil than the legal uncertainty resulting from a national court
Article 85 (2) declaration of nullity and a subsequent Article 85 (3) exemption by the Commission.
Finally, assuming the Commission will continue to cast the Article
85(1) net broadly to bring the great preponderance of agreements within
its ambit, there will remain a whole category of pro-competitive restraints
of trade that technically will violate Article 85(1) but that national courts
will not be empowered to properly review and, where appropriate, exempt
pursuant to Article 85(3). Absent a block exemption, the result is only a
continuation of the interminably slow process whereby the Commission
examines each complaint to determine its eligibility for a formal Article
85(3) exemption or a non-binding comfort letter. Thus, any meaningful
enforcement by national courts must somehow overcome Article 85's
structural hurdle. There must be either a redefinition of what constitutes
an Article 85(1) infringement such that the EU adopts a so-called rule of
reason approach to Article 85(1),106 or the national courts must in some
105. Id. at 9.
106. Although the Court ofJustice has consistently refused to interpret Article 85(1)
by balancing the pro- and anti-competitive effects of restrictive agreements under the

rule of reason approach, see Peeters, supra note 17, at 541, the Court of Justice, and
more recently the Commission, have considered particular pro-competitive ancillary
restraints, in effect, to be inherent in, or necessary for, the realization of a pro-competitive or competitively neutral transactions. These cases, while few in number, adopt a
more flexible attitude in which the Court assesses the overall competitive impact of the
ancillary restraint to determine whether an agreement falls within Article 85 (1), obviating the need in such instances for recourse to an Article 85(3) exemption. See Case 56/
65, Soci&6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm, 1966 E.C.R. 235; Case 26/76,
Metro v. Commission (No. 1), 1977 E.C.R. 1875, 1904; Case 258/78, Nungesser v. Commission (Maize Seed), 1982 E.C.R. 2015, 2069; Case 262/81, Coditel v. Cin6-Vog Films
(Coditel II), 1982 E.C.RL 3381, 3402; Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Schillgalis, 1986 E.C.R1 353, 384-85; Case 42/84, Remia v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 2545,
2571; Case 27/87, Louis Erauw-Jacquery v. La Hesbigonne SC, 1988 E.C.R. 1919, 193839; Elopak/Metal Box (Odin), 1990 OJ. (L 209) 15, 19-20; Moosehead/Whitbread,
1990 O.J. (L 100) 32, 32; Venit, supra note 25, at 43. The adoption of this more flexible
attitude under Article 85(1) could help mitigate the problem created by the Commis-
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fashion be empowered to exempt, or otherwise treat as valid, pro-competitive restraints of trade. The alternative is simply the untenable continuation of the current system of monopolistic review by the Commission of
restraints that enhance, rather than restrict, competition in the Common
Market.
IV. The Future of Competition Enforcement: National Court Review
of Pro-Competitive Restraints of Trade
The confluence of these trends toward decentralization raises anew an
issue that has previously received inadequate attention: the enforcement
by national courts of pro-competitive restraints of trade. The Commission
has recognized that, in cases which clearly would receive favorable treatment under Article 85(3), the national courts currently are left with the
unsavory choice of either automatic nullity under Article 85 (2) or staying
proceedings obliging the Commission to adopt a formal decision in each
such case (which could lead to no decision at all given the extraordinary
number of notified cases).1°7 Thus, the Court of Justice has recognized
that "the Article 85(3) system is inconsistent with the jurisdiction on the
part of national courts to make a finding of nullity during the period
between notification and the date on which the Commission takes a decision."108 Similarly, in 1990 the Commission noted that the current
approach to new agreements, whereby national courts suspend proceedings pending a formal decision by the Commission, is seldom a viable
alternative given that the overwhelming majority of cases are settled by the
Commission through informal comfort letters.10 9 Clearly, a change is
necessary for national court enforcement of pro-competitive restraints of
trade to be adequate and effective, and nothing the Union has done so far
provides any meaningful remedy.
In an important development, however, the Commission, in its earlier
drafts of the Notice, suggested an approach of "relative validity" for new
agreements as a corollary to the "provisional validity" of old agreements
enunciated in Brasseriede Haecht (No. 2).110 Under this approach, national
courts may, pursuant to Article 85(2), treat notified agreements as valid
between the parties to the litigation if "on the basis of the existing case law
... there is no reasonable doubt that the notified agreement fulfills all the
conditions of Art. 85(3). " 11 1 Thus, if the national court finds that an

agreement is clearly compatible with Article 85(1) because the agreement
has no appreciable effect on competition or on trade between Member
sion's inability to grant individual exemptions effectively and efficiently, since fewer
agreements would fall under Article 85(1), thus sparing such agreements from the Article 85(1) prohibition and the Article 85(2) sanction of nullity.
107. Commission Document, supra note 21, Annex 2 at 3.

108. Case 59/77, De Bloos v. Bouyer, 1977 E.C.R 2359, 2370.
109. Commission Document, supra note 21, Annex 2 at 2.
110. Id. Annex 2 at 3. See also supra notes 4145 and accompanying text.
111. See Commission Document, supra note 21, at 3. The Commission also emphasized, however, that this validity has authority only as between the parties not erga omnes.
See id.
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States, the national court should proceed with the case whether or not it
has been notified. It appears that the "relative validity" approach envisages that national courts will apply the case law of the Court ofJustice and
the Commission in determining whether an agreement infringes Article
85(1) or is exempt under Article 85(3). Under this approach, if the court
concludes that there is no reasonable doubt that a notified agreement or
practice fulfills all conditions of Article 85(3), it may treat the agreement
as valid between the parties to the litigation. 112 This gives national courts
what appears to be a discretionary "quasi-exemption" power, 1" 8 which
applies between the parties as long as the Commission has not adopted a
negative decision.
Recently, an even more radical approach has been suggested by the
former EC Commissioner for Competition, Sir Leon Brittan. As he
explained the notion:
In practice, the prohibition envisaged in Article 85(1) has in the past been
enforced by National Courts very rarely indeed. The question therefore
arises, whether it is now time for the Commission to propose that this [Article 85(3)] monopoly be lifted, and that National Courts, and indeed
national competition authorities,114be given the concurrent jurisdiction to
grant Article 85(3) exemptions.
Commissioner Brittan therefore proposed that national courts examine
agreements to determine whether they violate Article 85(1) and, if so, that
they be allowed to consider whether such agreements enjoy an Article
85(3) exemption. What Sir Leon Brittan is entertaining is nothing short
of a subsidiarity revolution in the enforcement of EU competition laws.
Recognizing that such an approach could result in "significantly increased
enforcement at [the] national level," the prospect of a national court Article 85(3) exemption Could arrest what one Commission official called the
"relative failure so far of our efforts to encourage private enforcement of
EC competition law through the courts.""15 Such an approach would
remove the most significant obstacle to meaningful decentralized enforcement of competition rules, thereby concomitantly enabling the Commission to concentrate on significant and complex cases having far-reaching
impacts on the Union.
These two approaches, the relative validity approach and the national
court exemption proposal, follow logically from the Commission's and the
Court's renewed emphasis on decentralized enforcement of EU competi112. See id., Annex 1 at 5.
113. See id., Annex 2 at 4.
114. Brittan Speech, supra note 7, at 4. Such a proposal would arguably be effected
by amending Regulation 17 to eliminate Article 9(1)'s grant of exclusive competence to
the Commission to rule on Article 85(3) exemptions. Regulation 17, supra note 13, art.
9(1); Peeters, supra note 17, at 536, 569 (solution to administrative problems resulting
from Commission's exclusive Article 85(3) exemption power is lifting of Regulation
17's grant to Commission of exclusive jurisdiction over Article 85(3)).
115. Jonathan Faull, The Enforcement of Competition Policy in the European Community: A
Mature System, 1991 FORDHAM Coiu. L. INsr. 134 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1992), reprinted in
15 FoRDH.AM INT'L LJ. 219, 222 (1991-1992).
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tion rules. Indeed, 'the Commission has noted that it must show some
flexibility in the approach of Article 85(3) if it wants decentralization to
become a success.1 1 6 Just as the Court in Delimitis has given national
courts the freedom to enforce competition laws in clear instances of Article 85(1) violations, a flexible "relative validity" approach or "national
court exemption" approach could similarly give national courts the freedom to exclude certain agreements from the application of Article 85(1)
where such agreements raise no concerns as to their adverse competitive
impact. Indeed, there is a certain illogic to the notion that national courts
are encouraged to apply Article 85(1) to straightforward, uncomplicated
cases of competition infringements, but they have no place whatsoever
handling straightforward, uncomplicated cases involving pro-competitive
restraints of trade. In both contexts the same policy concerns about
decentralization are raised. As the Commission noted: (i) more frequent
national court application would remind private citizens that the competition provisions are part of the law of each Member State leading to fuller
acceptance and use of such provisions; (ii) decentralized application
would provide an expedited and efficient means to apply the competition
rules; and (iii) a reinforced role of national courts would reduce the Commission's workload, thus permitting it to more rapidly and effectively han117
dle its own caseload.
Moreover, greater national court enforcement of Article 85 would
benefit private parties. The Commission cannot award compensation for
loss suffered as a result of an infringement of EU competition rules. By
contrast, national courts can often give expedited interim measure injunctions, consider concurrent claims based on national and EU competition
laws, and, in certain circumstances, award legal fees to the successful applicant.1 18 Thus, private parties have strong incentives to pursue EU competition law claims before national courts if they could be assured that such
courts could effectively enforce EU competition rules. The proposals
ensure that national court enforcement would be more meaningful and
effective, thus encouraging plaintiffs to seek recourse in the national
courts rather than through a complaint lodged with the Commission.
Finally, there are no overwhelming policy reasons why national courts
could not handle straightforward agreements involving pro-competitive
restraints of trade. With guidance of the kind offered in Delimitis and the
Notice, a national court could follow the case-law of the Commission and
the Court of Justice in determining the applicability of Article 85(3).
116. See Commission Document, supra note 21, Annex 2 at 3.
117. See Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 27, 39.
118. See Notice on Cooperation, supra note 8, at 7; Joined Cases 253/78 & 1-3/79,
Procureur de Ia R~publique v. Giry, 1980 E.C.R. 2327, 2374-75 (parallel application of
national competition law permitted insofar as it does not prejudice uniform application
throughout Common Market); Case 22/78, Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission,
1979 E.C.R. 1869, 1899 (Community law covers any agreement or any practice that is
capable of constituting threat to freedom of trade between Member States; on the other
hand, conduct whose effects are confined to territory of single Member State is governed by national legal order); Jacobs, supra note 14, at 1367-68.
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Analogizing from Delimitis, a distinction could be drawn between agreements that are clearly permissible as a pro-competitive restraint, and those
that may be held to infringe Article 85(1)'s prohibition on restrictive
agreements. If the restraint is clearly not caught by Article 85 (1) or would
be exempt under Article 85(3), such that the Commission or the Court
would not take a different view, the Member State court may freely rule on
the inapplicability of Article 85(1) under either a relative validity
approach or national court Article 85(3) exemption. On the other hand,
if there is a possibility that the Commission or the Court would hold that
the restriction infringes Article 85(1) and is not exempt under Article
85 (3), the national court must act more cautiously. In such cases, national
courts should follow the guidance suggested by the Notice and suspend
proceedings pending an interim decision by the Commission. In highly
controversial cases, an Article 177 reference to the Court ofJustice may be
necessary and would continue to be available. Such an approach ensures
that national courts will not abuse their powers in ruling on questions of
Article 85(1) infringements in the context of pro-competitive restraints of
trade.
Unfortunately, despite the strong policies supporting a move in the
direction of relative validity or the more promising national court exemption approach, neither option appears to be imminently on the horizon.
The relative validity approach, while in the earliest drafts of the Notice,' 19
was omitted from the published draft of the Notice' 20 and the final Notice
on Cooperation. One need not speculate as to the reason for its omission,
but it suggests that the Commission rejected this option for the time
being. As for the national court Article 85(3) exemption, Sir Leon Brittan
has confirmed that while the Commission is considering this option, it
believes that "the time is not yet right to take this step." 12 1 This is because
of concern that the Commission's establishment over the past thirty years
of uniform enforcement of EU competition laws would be undermined
because of disparate domestic legislation and enforcement mechanisms in
the Member States. Such differential application of Union laws would,
Brittan fears, result in forum shopping leading to the "fragmentation of
22
the common market and distortions of capital flows."'
Sir Leon Brittan's concern for disuniformity and forum shopping as
the basis for rejecting or postponing a national court exemption approach
is misplaced. While it is certainly true that Member States do not have
equally effective or sophisticated competition enforcement regimes, there
is no reason to fear that adopting a national court exemption approach
would, in any novel way, result in the "differential application" of Union
laws or forum shopping. This is because forum shopping and disuniformity are inherent in the decentralized application of competition
119. Commission Document, supra note 21, Annex 2.
120. Draft Antitrust Enforcement (National Courts) Guidelines, rep-inted in 4
C.M.L.R_ 524 (1992).
121. Brittan Speech, supra note 7, at 5.
122. Id. at 4.
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laws, with or without a national court exemption power. It is well known
that the procedures entitling injured parties to seek remedies before
national courts vary from one Member State to another;123 the rights conferred by Union law are exercised before national courts in accordance
with the procedures and conditions laid down by national rules. 124 Thus,
for example, in certain Member States the availability of damages may
depend upon whether the relevant national law protects private or public
interests. 125 Futher, forum shopping is implicitly tolerated under the
Brussels Convention in that a plaintiff alleging an EU competition
infringement arguably may sue in the jurisdiction where the defendant is
domiciled, the jurisdiction where the illegal conduct occurred, or the
jurisdiction where the resulting injury occurred. 126 Moreover, pursuant to
Article 26, the decisions of the courts of one signatory state must be recog123. Jacobs, supra note 14, at 1365-66 (citing LA COMMISSION DE LA CEE, CoLLEcTION; ETUDES SERIE CONCURRENCE No. 1, LA REPARATION DES CONSEQUENCES DOMMAGEA3LES D'UNE VIOLATION DES ARTICLES 85 ET 86 Du TAITrrE INsrITUANT LA CEE (1966)
(1966 Commission study on rights of plaintiff to recover damages for breach of EU
competition laws in each Member State)).
124. Case 33/76, Rewe v. Landwirtschaftskammer Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989, 1998;
Case 45/76, Comet BV v. Produktschap Voor Siergewassen, 1976 E.C.R. 2043, 2053;
Case 61/79, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit Italiana Srl., 1980
E.C.R. 1205, 1226; Case 826/79, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. MIRECO,
1980 E.C.R 2559, 2574-75; Case 199/82, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v.
S.p.A. San Giorgio, 1983 E.C.R. 3595, 3612. Recourse to national court procedures or
conditions is not permissible, however, where such national conditions or procedures
make it impossible in practice to exercise the Union rights that national courts are
obliged to protect, Rewe, 1976 E.C.R. at 1998, or if such rules are less favorable than
those governing the same right of action of a domestic nature. Comet, 1976 E.C.R. at
2053. See alo Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 2
C.M.L.R. 66, 114 (1993) (Member State obliged to make good damage caused to individuals by infringements of Community law for which it was responsible).
125. See Garden Cottage Foods v. Milk Marketing Board, 1 App. Cas. 130, 144 (1984);
Bourgoin S.A. v. Ministry of Agriculture Fishers and Food, 3 W.L.R. 1027, 1034 (1985);
Answer to Written Question No. 519/72, 1973 O.J. (C 67) 55.
126. Convention onJurisdiction and the Enforcement of Civil and CommercialJudgments, Sept. 27, 1968, reprinted in BULL. EuR. CoMM., Supp. 2/69 at 17, arts. 2, 5 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]; Case 21/76, Handelswekerij GJ. Bier B.V. v. Mines de
Potasse d'Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735, 1745-47 (Article 5 of Brussels Convention
makes provision in a number of cases for special jurisdiction, which plaintiff may opt to
choose; plaintiff suing in tort, delict, or quasi-delict has option to commence proceedings either at place where damage occurred or place of event giving rising to it); ALAN
DAsmwooD Er AL., A GUIDE TO THE CIVILJURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS CONVENION 2124 (1987) (under Articles 2 and 5(1), claims in matters relating to contract may be
brought before either courts ofjurisdiction where obligation in question is to be performed or courts of jurisdiction where defendant is domiciled; under Articles 2 and
5(3), tortious claims may be brought before courts of jurisdiction where damage
occurred,jurisdiction where event giving rise to damage occurred, orjurisdiction where
defendent is domiciled; under Articles 2 and 5(5), disputes arising out of activities of
branch, agency, or other establishment of parent body may be brought before courts in
jurisdiction of subsidiarity body or before courts ofjurisdiction of parent body). But see
Case T-24/90, Automec Srl. v. E.C. Commission, 5 C.M.L.R. 431, 458-59 (1992) (Advocate General Edward) (Brussels and Lugano Conventions may apply, but it is not clear
how private actions to enforce direct rights under Articles 85 and 86 are to be treated
under those Conventions; enforcement of final judgments within the Union should not
prove too difficult, provided Brussels Convention applies).
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nized in the courts of other signatories to the Convention. 127 Thus, even
absent a national court Article 85(3) exemption power, forum shopping
among national courts and between national courts and the Commission
already exists when plaintiffs sue to enforce Article 85(1) and Article 86.
As for concerns for the differential application of EU competition
laws, this is no more an issue for Article 85(3) than for Article 85(1) and
Article 86. As the Court of justice emphasized:
The binding force of the Treaty and of measures taken in application of it
must not differ from one state to another as a result of internal measures,
lest the functioning of the Community system should be impeded and the
achievement of the aims of the Treaty placed in peril. Consequently, conflicts between the rules of the Community and national rules in the matter
of the law on cartels must be resolved
by applying the principle that Com28
munity law takes precedence.'
Consequently, as recognized by the Court ofJustice, disuniformity is inherent in the Union's decentralized competition regime, in which Articles
85(1) and 86 create direct rights which national courts must safeguard. 129
Indeed, disuniformity is an issue in applying all laws in a "federal" system.
Provided there is an established doctrine of primacy of Union law' 3 0 and
an effective system ofjudicial review, however, disuniformity can be minimized through the oversight of the judicial organs. Such judicial review
exists through recourse to the Commission, the Court of First Instance,
and the Court of Justice. Moreover, the European Union has frequently
considered creating a more advanced system ofjudicial review to supervise
national court judgments and reduce the attractiveness of forum shopping,13 ' and the newly created Court of First Instance is a concrete manifestation of this effort.
In sum, if disuniformity and forum shopping are truly the overriding
concerns of the Commission, then the very concept of decentralized application of EU competition laws would not be a fundamental goal of the
Union. Of course, such concerns are peripheral and the primary objective
is the effective enforcement of EU competition laws by the Commission
and the national courts alike. Effective national court enforcement of
Article 85 requires the ability of national courts to review pro-competitive
restraints of trade either under a relative validity approach or a national
court Article 85(3) exemption approach.
Thus, despite Commissioner Brittan's protestations against forum
shopping and differential application, there is no overriding reason for
the Union to refrain from correcting the most glaring impediment to
127. Brussels Convention, supra note 126, art. 26.

128. Case 14/68, Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1, 13-15.
129. See id. See also Case 127/73, BRT v. SABAM, 1974 E.C.1. 51, 62.

130. See, e.g., Case 106/77, Amminstrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal
S.pA., 1978 E.C.R. 629, 644-46; Case 11/70, International Handelsgesellschaft mbH v.
Einfuhr- und Vorratasstelle f6r Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1134; Case
14/68, Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1, 13-15; Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL,
1964 E.C.R. 585, 593-94.
131. See Venit, supra note 25, at 41.
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effective national court enforcement of EU competition laws. Indeed, in
commenting upon the current reluctance to grant national courts an Article 85(3) exemption power, even he concedes that "it is only a matter of
time before a sufficient consensus develops throughout the Union which
would enable this view to change. If the speed at which convergence on
this issue has been progressing over the last few years continues apace, this
will not be unduly long." 132 Thus, national court enforcement of procompetitive restraints to trade is inevitable, although regrettably not
imminent.
Conclusion
Subsidiarity has become "a critical epithet in the debate about the future
of Europe." 13 3 No longer simply a theoretical corrective to uncontrolled
federalism, subsidiarity is now enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty as a constitutional mandate delineating the proper allocation of shared powers.
Coupled with this is the Article 5 requirement that Member States, including the courts of Member States, "take all appropriate measures, whether
general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of
this Treaty .... "134 Thus, national courts, as well as the EU institutions,
are now charged with the obligation to enforce Treaty provisions, including Articles 85 and 86, with the principle of subsidiarity foremost in mind.
The Commission has acknowledged that, due to sheer volume, private
parties may no longer reasonably expect a formal Article 85(3) decision
exempting their agreements.' 3 5 Furthermore, the procedural reforms the
Commission has made will only reduce, not resolve, the problems created
by lack of adequate resources and its monopolistic review under Article
85(3). The consequence of the current impasse is legal uncertainty and
the concomitant harm to private undertakings competing in the Common
Market. For the EU competition rules to be competently and efficiently
enforced, the Commission can no longer effectively be the sole arbiter of
Article 85 infringements.
Delimitis, Automec, and the Notice on Cooperation suggest that the
power to enforce competition law as applied to private undertakings may
gradually give way to more vigorous enforcement by national courts. In
particular, these trends signal the Commission's willingness to leave to
national courts the enforcement of uncomplicated cases of manifest
infringement of Article 85(1), clear protection under an Article 85(3)
block exemption, and eventually, obvious instances of pro-competitive
restraints of trade. Such an approach frees the Commission to focus its
efforts on addressing the more complicated and significant issues of com132. Brittan Speech, supra note 7, at 5.
133. Trachtman, supra note 4, at 468.

134. EEC TR.aniy, art. 5. See also Constantinesco, supra note 4, at 41 (Article 5, without expressly proclaiming subsidiarity, seems to have been inspired by the notion; one
may think here we have the first, although admittedly indirect, adoption of subsidiarity
by primary Union law).
135. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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petition enforcement in the private and public sectors. Moreover, these
trends are supported by cogent policy arguments: effective enforcement
of the competition rules by the most efficient and appropriate means possible, in fidelity to the principle of subsidiarity. Thus, the application of
the subsidiarity principle to EU competition enforcement is no longer
merely a theoretical possibility, it is increasingly becoming a practical
necessity.

